Archive | Blog

RSS feed for this section

BootStrapping Strategies Part 4: Building Defensibility

When Ubiquiti released the NanoStation “customer premise equipment” (CPE) in 2008, it changed the “Wireless Internet Service Provider” (WISP) market.  WISP’s (much like Ubiquiti) typically started as bootstrapped entrepreneurial ventures that were cash flow constrained.  With the introduction of the disruptive cost/performance NanoStation CPE, Ubiquiti provided a near zero time return on capital investment to the WISP operators and correspondingly greatly accelerated their network deployments worldwide.

At this time, Ubiquiti’s business was booming and highly profitable, but I was also scared to death because the business was still not defensible.  Although our new system CPE business was technically much more sophisticated than our original radio module hardware business, it was still based on the 802.11 WiFi standard.  And therefore, it could potentially be replaced in these growing WISP networks by a more cost-effective solution from a competitor.

3COM's popular 3C509 NIC

Making standards based hardware is a dangerous position for a company to be in.   A great example from the past is the story of 3COM  — the pioneer of the original 802.3 Ethernet standard.  In its early years, 3COM was a monster company commanding very high margins for their network interface cards (NIC’s), which were used in nearly every networked PC during the 1990’s.  When I was a teenager I had a business setting up PC networks and would also use hundreds of 3Com’s popular 3C509 PCI cards to install into computers.  However, once the Ethernet 802.3 standard became more popular, new competitors entered the market supported by higher levels of hardware integration, and drove 3Com’s NIC business profitability into the ground.

I knew that our 802.11 WiFi based NanoStation CPE business would follow the same cycle of prosperity to commoditization that 3Com’s NIC business experienced if we did not correct the course quickly.  Fortunately, in our case, there was one key shortcoming of using the 802.11 WiFi standard for outdoor long-distance wireless that we were able to take advantage of in creating a defensible business.

The 802.11 WiFi standard is based on a contention protocol referred to as “Carrier Sense Multiple Access, Collision Avoidance” (CSMA/CA).  This type of protocol is very effective in an indoor environment where all clients are located in close proximity of the Access Point.  However, the WISP networks were not indoor networks; they were outdoor networks typically spanning many miles using directional antennas.  In this scenario, the clients have a direct line of sight to the Access Point, but become isolated “hidden nodes” to each other.  Consequently, each isolated client, unaware of the presence of their neighbors, assumes they are in the clear to transmit and their transmissions will collide with the other isolated clients at the remotely located Access Point.  As the network scales in clients, the collisions become exponentially worse.  Additionally, these same remotely located clients will often falsely interpret the presence of local transmissions from competing networks as the traffic of their real neighbors and at times turn to an idle state.  In short, the 802.11 wifi standard breaks down in these outdoor long-range networks as client capacity scales and is incapable of consistently supporting quality of service levels for the next-generation Internet applications including streaming video, VoIP, and gaming.

Outdoor 802.11 WiFi and The Hidden Node Problem

18 months after releasing NanoStation, Ubiquiti would solve these problems with our new AirMax technology platform.  It consisted of Access Points, antennas, and a new NanoStation CPE.   Although the hardware was still WiFi based, there was one very important difference: the protocol no longer relied on the 802.11 WiFi standard.  Instead, the AirMax protocol was based on a “Time Division MultipleAccess” (TDMA) scheme much like those used in Cellular Networks.  Unlike the 802.11 WiFi standard, the AirMax protocol was deterministic, resolved the hidden node problem, and allowed for far greater scalability, noise mitigation, and quality of service performance when compared with 802.11 standard equipment deployed in a long-distance outdoor environment.

AirMax TDMA Protocol

Not only did AirMax bring important performance improvements to the WISP market, it marked the beginning of Ubiquiti’s defensible business model.  Now, when WISP’s built AirMax based networks, they were “locked-in.”  And as the AirMax market expanded, we would reinforce the strength of the platform by adding additional software features, management applications, and advanced products.  Following the Apple model, Airmax put us in a great position of leverage as we now controlled our own technology platform, and through our community, we would also control the end-user relationship.

Comments { 4 }

BootStrapping Strategies Part 3: Product Development Models: Predictive vs. Reactive

In Part 2, I talked about Ubiquiti Networks’ beginnings that started with a flawed business strategy and eventually evolved to define a market.  Before I tell the follow-on story, I would like to preface it with a discussion of how I see two kinds of product development models:  “predictive” and “reactive.”

A predictive development model requires a mastery of market understanding combined with a team that has a demonstrated history of applicable market execution.  The gold standard for the predictive development model is Apple, Inc.  The iPhone for example combined a mastery of user experience understanding with a world-class development team that knew exactly how to bring the polished technology platform to market.  Apple invested in a very specific direction and they bet big.

Using vessels as an analogy, predictive strategies are like “super tankers” with destinations locked in place.  They are backed by a strong commitment to a pre-determined plan, with significant investment, and large, focused teams. And once the ship is set in motion, it is difficult to change direction.  But, when done right, they pack a giant punch and can fundamentally change markets like Apple did when they redefined the mobile industry overnight with iPhone.

The predictive model is also the basis of the venture capital world.  However, there is a difference between Apple and startup companies.  Where Apple has accumulated years of empirical experience (including many failures) in achieving a mastery of market understanding and development execution, new companies by definition do not have market experience.

From this point of view, the lack of funding or VC influence is actually one of the great advantages of bootstrapping.  Their absence forces the adoption of a “reactive” model with the goal to get something to market as quickly as possible to generate cash flow first and then react to the market challenges and feedback in refining the product strategy.  If a predictive model is analogous to a super-tanker, a reactive model is more like a speed-boat with agility to change directions quickly.

A reactive model will succeed when it is lead by an effective entrepreneur. At the core, this individual must be a tireless, disciplined, and creative problem-solver who is adaptable to market challenges and who can become incrementally more skilled with experience.

When Ubiquiti was faced with instant commoditization from lower-cost Asia competitor clones shortly after our initial radio module release, I quickly was forced to change development directions.  I knew we could never compete with Asia competitors in a hardware only module business; if we were to survive, we had to go upstream and compete with our system customers.  This would mean pulling together development resources that could deliver a complete solution to market that included investment into system hardware design, mechanical design, antenna design, and firmware development.  It would also mean offending a lot of our existing system solution customer base.

At that time (2006), the outdoor hi-power WiFi radio module market we helped to create was an integral part of the Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP) industry.  WISP’s used these modules inside BaseStations and Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) to deliver broadband Internet access over many miles in rural and underserved communities throughout the world.   The CPE’s when placed on the roofs of homes and offices would receive the wireless signal from the Basestations many miles away.  It was the CPE cost that largely determined how fast the operator could realize a return on investment from adding a new subscriber.  Consequently, WISP’s were very interested in reducing their CPE costs to become more profitable.  At that time, Asia competitor cloned hi-power radio modules were selling for about $30 and when included into a complete CPE system, the system cost was roughly $150.  Our new goal was to transition from the module business and compete in the CPE market by introducing a purpose-built integrated CPE for under $150.

After 15 months of challenging development, we finally launched the PowerStation in May of 2007 and it was a miserable failure.  Although it was cost compelling for the U.S. market, we soon discovered it was not competitive in the international market.  Furthermore, it was too heavy for economical shipment, had several hardware issues affecting field performance, was missing key fundamental software features, had a poor installation experience, and it was poorly designed for volume manufacturing.

Two months after PowerStation launch (July of 2007), we learned our lessons, regrouped, and changed directions quickly again.  Only six months later (January of 2008) we would launch an entirely revamped CPE solution called NanoStation.  Unlike the fatal flaws of PowerStation, NanoStation was compact, with a clever cost-effective design, higher performance, optimized for volume manufacturing, and came with a much richer user experience.  Most
importantly, at a sub $60 price point, it stood to change the economics of the WISP industry and became a smash hit.  Ubiquiti would finish the 2008 calendar year with $50mm in revenue lead by NanoStation.

The story of how Ubiquiti’s product strategy would evolve into the NanoStation design is an example of a “reactive” development model.  We were not experts when we entered the market, but after surviving long enough to accumulate experience, we were able to adapt to the market challenges and find success.

Fast-forward four years later to today, Ubiquiti is now completing its first predictive development effort in AirFiber.  Whereas the predictive model would not have been possible for us before, it now has become a viable model after several years of experience competing in our market.  The AirFiber story is one that combines a mastery of market understanding with a radio engineering dream team who has a history of development execution.

Comments { 2 }

Commoditization and Leverage

When a technology product is brought to market, it is typically the result of several partners working together.  For instance, an Android phone is the result of companies like HTC or Samsung productizing Google’s underlying mobile operating system platform and partnering with mobile carriers such as AT&T and Verizon who use their networks and stores to proliferate product sales to end users.

Android now accounts for the majority of the sales for the smart phone market, but the various Android hardware companies combined have far less profitability compared to Apple. Where Apple has been able to improve their strong financial fundamentals and profitability along with their legendary revenue growth, the Android smart phone vendors in general have seen their gross margins become increasingly under pressure.

So, the question is how can Apple protect their profitability and financial fundamentals when Android hardware vendors cannot?  It is because embedded in Apple’s business strategy is great leverage and protection against commoditization.

First, let’s take a deeper look at the Android world.  Android has evolved into a powerful technology platform.  Unfortunately, for the hardware companies, none of them own the platform.  As a hardware vendor, this is a big problem because if everyone has access to the same technology, there is by definition no competitive advantage.  And the result is inevitable commoditization — where gross margins become pressured as competitors are forced to compete on price.

When hardware vendors become commoditized, the balance of power shifts to the sales enablers.  In this case, Android hardware vendors become increasingly at the mercy of their carrier partners.  From a carrier point of view, hardware commoditization is great as it provides leverage to pit hardware vendors against each other and allows the carriers to differentiate themselves on the basis of their own value, such as network quality.  It also allows the carrier to “own” the end user relationship.  “Owning” the end-user relationship can be powerful as it creates long-term brand loyalty.

In sharp contrast, what Apple has been able to do in the smart phone market is remarkable.  Not only have they been able to own their technology platform and create significant competitive advantage, they have also succeeded in “owning” the end user through great brand marketing and use of their stores.  Correspondingly, they have commoditized the carriers.  Apple’s strategy has not only allowed them to maintain incredible profitability in the smart phone market, but by controlling the end-user relationship, they have also built a tremendously loyal user base they can leverage for future new technology market introductions.

On a side note — Recently, after watching Prometheus, I went back and watched the original Alien movie.  At one point, the crew of the ship turns to the Android Ash for an explanation for what the Alien is.  In which he says:

Ash: “You still don’t understand what you’re dealing with, do you? A Perfect Organism.”

Google has Android, but Apple just might be the Alien.  In terms of defensibility and leverage, the business model is perfection.

Comments { 5 }

Bootstrapping Strategies Part 2: “Fatigue Makes Cowards of Us All” — Vince Lombardi

My fitness trainer often shouts this phrase to me whenever I am beginning to hit the wall during workouts (Terry Canon, respect).  The motivation of the phrase is simple – when we get tired or when we are faced with adversity; our mental strength and concentration are put to the test.  And those that have the resiliency to fight through adversity and stay focused on goals will have a significant competitive advantage over those that cannot.

In 2005, Ubiquiti would launch its first product called “SuperRange” – essentially a super-charged Wi-Fi module for long-distance outdoor wireless applications.

Because the product had incredible demand from a niche market of independent operators and distributors that served them, we were able to secure customer payment upfront to fund manufacturing and instantly became a profitable business with cash flow.  The appeal of our “SuperRange” module was that it performed better over long-distances compared with the standard commodity Wi-Fi modules being sold in volume.  Although we charged a cost premium for our module compared with the existing commodity one being used at the time, the operators had no problem paying the premium as they saw it had a great overall cost/performance improvement in their systems.

However, there were 2 disastrous variables working in the background that would inevitably be fatal to my initial business strategy:

  1. Our $35 manufacturing cost was representative of our economies of scale in 1,000’s of quantities.  In contrast, the popular commodity modules had a $20 resale price were coming from Asia in 1,000,000’s of quantities.  Interestingly, there was no significant intrinsic design or manufacturing cost premium in our enhanced design compared to the commonly sold commodity module.  We were just completely outmatched with our competitors from a manufacturing volume/cost leverage standpoint.
  2. Our improvements were simple HW design additions that could easily be copied

You can imagine what happened next.  The commodity Wi-Fi module manufactures soon noticed our growing business and gross margins and said “Hey, this is a great idea; we can manufacture a premium module design and take over their market”  Within months, they copied our HW design and clones started appearing in our sales channels at below our manufacturing costs.

Overnight, growth slowed, customers turned on us saying we had no business selling such over-priced hardware, and I found myself in an impossible position to compete; I was contemplating shutting the doors and moving on with my life.

The irony is that the majority of people who had chimed in with an educated business opinion on my initial strategy told me this would happen.  And it played out exactly like they said it would.  But, I didn’t listen; and I learned a very painful lesson that would cause me to question myself.  As it turns out, it would become the stage for the best opportunity I could wish for.

We shouldn’t look at being handed adversity in life as a bad thing; if you are up for it, then it really becomes an opportunity to find out what you are made of.  And if you can develop the ability to step up and conquer even the most hopeless of challenges, you certainly will gain an attribute that will give you a significant competitive advantage over your peers.  Instead of letting adversity get the best of me, this would mark the first inflection point in Ubiquiti’s growth.   I would quickly meet adversity head-on, recalibrate, and adopt a new strategy that would define an Industry.

Comments { 7 }

Bootstrapping Strategies Part 1: The Compromise between Today and Tomorrow

Perhaps something of an oddity amongst publicly traded tech companies, Ubiquiti Networks was bootstrapped with no operational funding from inception up to the IPO.  For a software company, this path is challenging enough.  But, Ubiquiti makes hardware.  And with making hardware comes the additional financial burden of funding larger and larger manufacturing expenses as the business grows. People often ask me how we were able to pull this off.   Over the course of the next several weeks, I will introduce a set of bootstrapping strategies, which I hope will give insight into things I did well and things I maybe did not do so well in leading Ubiquiti from my apartment through our IPO.

In sharp contrast to Ubiquiti’s bootstrapped beginnings, venture capital backed companies are often supported by experienced, savvy investors with operational backgrounds, strategic mindsets, and a commitment to establishing expensive, but necessary infrastructure within their companies (including forming an experience board, hiring corporate lawyers, hiring experienced management, planning a public relations campaign, and creating an IP portfolio).  The assumption is this infrastructure will one day be imperative to protecting the company’s standing.  And, it took my own learning experiences to realize something — they are right.  VC’s are playing for tomorrow.

As a bootstrapping entrepreneur perhaps the biggest challenge is how to balance playing for today vs. playing for tomorrow.  When you are starting, there is no money or time to really look at tomorrow; you can easily get caught in the moment as you are scrapping with everything you have trying to survive today.

When I left my job at Apple in 2005 to dedicate myself to Ubiquiti, my only thought was “if this doesn’t work out, I am screwed.”  It was March of 2005 and my $600/month studio apartment lease down the street from Apple HQ was coming up for renewal.  Instead of committing to another year, I moved my futon and my HW lab into an economical $650/month office surrounded by bail bonds shops across the street from the San Jose Courthouse where I would make my home for the next several months.   Although there was sufficient capital from upfront customer down payments to fund the first manufacturing builds, I was locked in survival mode and entirely focused on how I was going to setup manufacturing, make the shipment lead-times, support initial customers, come up with new product designs, and build the Ubiquiti brand.

Ubiquiti's first office, 2005
Ubiquiti’s First Office, 2005

I had no real advisors, no board members, no corporate lawyers, no accounting, and no IP strategy.  I was completely winging it and was playing to survive another day.  I really did not always see the importance of living for tomorrow until much later on in the company timeline.  One of the biggest regrets I have today is that I did not make the transition earlier.

But to be fair, if Ubiquiti would have ended up as a failure and shut its doors early, playing for tomorrow would have become irrelevant.  Therefore, the best strategy is to incrementally increase your “insurance” as the value of your company increases and resources become more available.

Here are 3 areas of important “insurance” early-stage bootstrappers should look at:

Relationship Contracts:  At this point, you just got in the game.  You might have hired some contractors, partnered with another company, or signed up your first distributor.  No matter what the nature of the relationship is — an employee, friend, contractor, vendor, distributor, partner, etc. – EVERY ONE should be under a contract that protects the company’s best interest.  Get these signed once, filed and out of the way.  It is your most critical insurance.  Unfortunately, a lawyer should be engaged to create these contracts (I will talk about how to handle lawyers in a later post).  For now, remember when dealing with lawyers -– they work for YOU and you should always run them “closed-loop” with a specific scope of deliverables and defined project fee determined up-front.

Initial IP (start with Trademarks):  By now, you might be starting to produce product and generate some profits.  In order to protect against unfair competition as your product sales grow, you should start looking at some IP investment.  If funding a patent portfolio is still out of reach, start with provisional patents and  trademarks.  Trademarks also can provide powerful insurance against unfair competition at good economics.   They are important to have in the regions where a product is sold, but also IMPERATIVE to have in the region of manufacturing.  There are trademark consultants, patent agents, and online resources that can assist in economically registering trademarks and provisional patents.

Bookkeeping / Tax Accounting:  As you start to file corporate tax returns, it is important that you have an expert not only making sure you stay within the law, but someone who knows how to take full advantage of tax credits and strategies.  When I was starting Ubiquiti in the early years, even though it was incredibly profitable, cash flow was challenging as funds were constantly being reinvested into larger manufacturing volumes.  In this case, the timing of the re-investment and the tax obligations created severe cash flow challenges.  An experienced corporate tax accountant can find tax strategies that align with bootstrapping; including in this case for instance, tax payment deferral.  Proper book-keeping with as much transparency as possible is also important as your company grows as it will play a major role in facilitating future funding opportunities and maximizing your company’s perceived valuation.

Keep in mind, that this is just the beginning of the infrastructure you will have to commit to as the company matures.  But, hopefully by that time, you will have found a good advisor that can help to fill in the more advanced pieces.

Comments { 17 }

New Office

Ubiquiti’s Silicon Valley branch moved to a larger facility in San Jose last month.  Attached are photos showing the property after our design build out.

We had some specific goals we wanted to achieve with the design:

1.      Build an engineer’s dream work environment.  It’s a sleek, modern look where no expense was spared for our lab areas and developer team offices.  Interesting fact — one of our own developers put on his interior design hat and came up with the entire concept.  As you can see, there were many unique approaches including extensive use of frameless glass, polished concrete, stainless steel columns, beam lighting, and Wink whiteboard walls. John Tso is the man!

2.     Optimize developer team efficiency, and productivity.  Technology platforms teams (such as UniFi and AirVision) now have their own team offices where developers can work together collaboratively.  In a way, this new office is very analogous to a technology incubator where we have independent software teams working on unique platforms while each leveraging Ubiquiti’s existing IP, branding, operations, and hardware engineering resources

I really regret not making this upgrade sooner… I have a feeling that the additional overhead costs of an inspiring work environment are more than offset by the intangible value of having very happy engineers and in turn, having their productivity boosted.    Additionally, this new office has already made a difference in recruiting new top engineering talent!

Comments { 2 }

Why I created this Blog

Hi everyone; thanks for visiting. My goal is to make this site a platform to discuss a variety of topics ranging from the future of technology to random things that I just find cool.  One focus of the site will also be dedicated to sharing some insights from my own career experience in an effort to support the next generation of technical entrepreneurs building and leading companies to compete in the global marketplace.

Comments { 15 }